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Abstract 
This paper analyses government responsiveness to business demands for tax cuts, using case 
studies of reforms of corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find a 
high level of government responsiveness in both policy fields, but much higher 
responsiveness on inheritance tax. We argue that this difference between the two policy fields 
is the result of an effort by governments to balance three conflicting goals: (i) attracting 
investments, (ii) maintaining a high level of tax revenues, (iii) and maintaining electoral 
popularity. The intensity of these goal conflicts varied between the two policy fields. It was 
higher on corporate taxation, which led governments to combine cuts to corporate tax with 
compensatory measures, the abolition of inheritance tax in both countries was not combined 
with compensatory measures, because goal conflicts were low. We show that differences in 
the expected electoral and fiscal impacts of reforms explain the different levels of government 
responsiveness. Government efforts to reconcile the three policy goals under conditions of 
heightened business power entailed sacrificing redistributive goals that have characterized tax 
policies in earlier periods. (179 words). 
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How Governments Respond to Business Demands for Tax Cuts: An analysis of 
Corporate and Inheritance Tax Reforms in Austria and Sweden* 
 
Introduction 
The political power of business interest groups, organizations that represent the interests of 
the owners and senior executives of private firms, has increased significantly since the 1970s, 
resulting in intensified pressure on governments in rich democracies to respond to business 
demands. This development is frequently attributed to structural changes in the global 
economy that facilitated capital flight, as well as to changes in the political strategies of 
business, including more public campaigning and efforts to promote business-friendly policy 
ideas (Lindblom 1977; Svallfors 2016; Hacker and Pierson 2010b; Paster 2015; Paster 2017; 
Vogel 1989; Culpepper 2011). At the same time, some studies document an intensified 
assertiveness of business interest groups in their calls for tax cuts, reduced public spending, 
and general contraction of the public economy in many countries, including Germany 
(Kinderman 2016; Menz 2005), Sweden (Svallfors 2016: 512; Blyth 2001: 14) and the United 
States (Mizruchi 2013; Hacker and Pierson 2010a; Waterhouse 2013: 201-288).  
Our understanding of how the interests of powerful business groups are reflected in 
public policies is however limited by a lack of systematic knowledge of how governments 
respond to business demands. This is the question we seek to answer in this paper. We present 
a theoretical model of government responsiveness to business demands that suggests that 
governments develop policies that reconcile three conflicting goals: (a) attracting investments 
and maintaining business confidence; (b) maintaining an adequate level of tax revenues; and; 
(c) aligning policy choices with voter preferences. The intensity with which these goals 
conflict varies across policy issues, and we argue that governments will accept those business-
friendly policy measures which minimize conflicts between a and b and c.  
We explore the explanatory capability of this model with case-studies of government 
responsiveness to business demands focusing on two policy fields, corporate tax and 
inheritance tax, in two countries, Austria and Sweden, resulting in four cases. Business  
________ 
* For useful comments, we would like to thank the participants of the workshop 
‘Redistributive Politics: Comparative and Experimental Approaches’, held at Copenhagen 
Business School, April 30, 2018; and the participants at the seminar held at the Danish Center 
for Welfare Studies, Odense, May 20, 2018; in particular Romana Careja, Manuele Citi, 
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Patrick Fessenbecker, Klaus Petersen, David Rueda, Saila Stausholm, and Melike 
Wulfgramm.  
interest groups in both countries have pushed for cuts to, or even repeal, of both taxes, but  
the governments’ responses have varied considerably. While governments in both countries 
accepted business demands for tax cuts, they deliberately did so in ways that protected tax 
revenues and electoral support. Governments engineered reform designs that reconciled the 
three goals of business confidence, tax revenues, and voter preferences; rather than sacrificing 
voter support and tax revenues at the altar of business confidence. In other words, 
governments selectively heeded business demands where neither a fiscal drain nor an 
electoral backlash was likely.  
In the following section we elaborate theoretically how and why fiscal and electoral 
goals may mitigate government responsiveness to business demands. Then we move on to 
explain the research design, case-selection, and methods of data collection, followed by the 
empirical section, conclusion and discussion.   
  
How governments respond to business demands: The role of electoral and fiscal goals 
Over forty years ago, Charles Lindblom stated that “when a government official asks himself 
whether business needs a tax reduction, he knows he is asking a question about the welfare of 
the whole society” (Lindblom 1977: 177). State and society depend on investments by private 
firms, and this gives business a structurally privileged position in politics. The unavoidable 
need of market economies to maintain business confidence is a constraining factor on the 
policy choices available to governments.  
For several reasons, the structural power of business has increased since the 1970s. 
First, deregulation of capital mobility intensified competition for capital and investments, thus 
pressuring governments to lower taxes on business in order to appeal to international 
investors and mobile enterprises (Swank and Steinmo 2002: 645). Second, political and 
institutional constraints on the power of business also weakened. Katzenstein has explained in 
detail how the political logic of corporatism reduced structural inequities between business 
and labor (Katzenstein 1985) by granting organized labor access to policymaking arenas and 
balance or inhibit business influence (cf. Cameron 1984; Western 1991).  
The erosion of coordinated policymaking weakened organized labor (Klitgaard and 
Nørgaard 2014; Häusermann 2010) such that governments are now less dependent on unions 
for securing support for unpopular reforms. As Culpepper and Regan argue, “unions have 
neither the carrots with which to attract governments (…) nor the sticks with which to compel 
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their inclusion.” (2014: 724). A less coordinated setting for policymaking is advantageous for 
organized business, in that they can now utilize the structural dependence of governments. In 
addition, organized business has also channeled resources into alternative strategies for 
influence, such as media campaigns, lobbying efforts, and organizational re-arrangements.  
Maintaining business confidence is, however, only one of the goals pressuring 
governments in open capitalist economies. Two other goals are equally important for 
governments. Governments want to protect the overall level of tax revenues, and seek to 
avoid becoming the victim in a race to the bottom that hollows out the revenue-raising 
capacity of the state (cf.Swank and Steinmo 2002). “Governments need money. Modern 
governments need lots of money”, as Steinmo puts it (Steinmo 1993: 1). The goal of 
protecting revenues obtains particular relevance during periods of austerity, when 
governments are suffering from budget deficits and public debt and need an inflow of 
economic resources. Also, public revenues are critical for governments when they embark on 
realizing electoral pledges, which brings us to a third goal that democratic governments factor 
in when they decide on how to respond to demands raised by the business community; 
electoral consequences. If the general electorate perceives a tax cut to business to be unfair 
and a financial undermining of the ability of the state to provide social protection and public 
services, governments may instead seek out alternative routes to accommodate business that 
are less likely to generate an electoral backlash. 
These three goals – business confidence, stable public revenues, and electoral 
preferences – are potentially in conflict. Cutting taxes on business in an effort to attract or 
stimulate investments may undermine the state’s revenue-generating capacity, and force 
governments to either raise taxes again to reduce public debt caused by tax cuts or to cut 
expenditures (Romer and Romer 2007). Offering business attractive tax reductions may also 
appear as preferential political treatment of organized business and be difficult to justify 
electorally. If tax cuts for business are interpreted as tax cuts for the wealthy at the expense of 
social security for the middle class, governments may face a backlash at the ballot box. 
Alternatively, if governments instead opt for maintaining high taxes in areas of business 
interest, governments run the risk of lost business confidence, loss of economic viability and 
financial capacity to provide social security and popular public service.  
We argue that the intensity with which these three goals conflict varies across policy 
measures, and that governments seek policy solutions that minimize these goal conflicts.  On 
this background, we expect, as mentioned, governments to respond to business in dependence 
of the intensity with which these three goals are in conflict. If the business community 
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pressure for a type of tax cuts that are expensive in terms of lost revenues and/or difficult to 
align with general electoral preferences, the policy response of governments is expected to be 
moderate in terms of size and scale. If, on the other hand, business demand a type of tax cuts 
that have less significant financial implications and, also sits well with general electoral 
preferences, governments are freer to adopt a policy choice close to the ideal preference of 
business.  
 
Research Design and Methods 
We research these theoretical propositions with comparative case studies of corporate tax and 
inheritance tax policy reforms enacted in Sweden and Austria between the years 2004 and 
2013. Austria and Sweden are small coordinated capitalist economies, dependent on private 
investments and, in theory, especially vulnerable to capital flight. A strong tradition of 
corporatist policy-making has in the past tamed the structural power of business by directing 
its influence into institutional forms such as tripartite committees in both countries (Paster 
2014). However, these corporatist institutions have eroded, whereas advocacy campaigns, 
media campaigns, and lobbying have gained importance as mechanisms of business influence 
(Svallfors 2016; Pühringer and Stelzer-Orthofer 2016). Moreover, further integration of 
Central and Eastern European countries, with their lower tax rates, have raised the awareness 
in both countries of risks associated with tax competition.  
The combination of increased internationalization and a decreased institutional check on 
business has thus made these two small states intensely vulnerable to the threat of business 
exit, pressuring them to respond to business demands. Our case selection creates variation on 
the fiscal and electoral factors we expect to moderate government decisions on tax cuts for 
business. For all the OECD countries, revenues from corporate taxes far exceed revenues 
from inheritance taxes (figures 1 and 2), with 2.7 percent of GDP coming from corporate 
taxes versus just 0.1 percent of GDP from inheritance taxes. Sweden and Austria are in line 
with this pattern (OECD 2017). Corporate taxes are levied on corporate income and therefore 
affect only incorporated firms. The self-employed are not subject to corporate tax, and are 
taxed instead by personal income tax. Corporate taxes are thus skewed toward big business, 
and provide organized business – but not average voters – economic incentives to advocate 
reductions. Inheritance tax, on the other hand, affects not only persons inheriting firms, but 
also middle-class voters who inherit property or financial assets. The interests of the middle 
class are more aligned with those of business, and because of this, the intensity of the goal 
conflicts is weaker on inheritance taxes compared to corporate taxes. We therefore expect that 
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governments will respond strongly to business demands for cuts on inheritance taxes. 
Notwithstanding the fact that corporate taxes pose a greater cost burden on firms, the 
government response on this tax is expected to be moderated by fiscal and electoral 
considerations of the government. We summarize our expectations in table 1 below. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Expected government responses to business demands for tax cuts 
 Maintaining business  
confidence in conflict with 
 
 Electoral goal Revenue goal 
 
Expected government 
response  
Inheritance and 
gift tax 
No 
 
No Strong 
Corporate tax Yes 
 
Yes Moderate 
 
It should be stressed that our design and case-selection allow us to explore the plausibility of 
our theoretical argument rather than to test it rigorously. Specifically, the co-variation on 
electoral and revenue goals generates an over-determined outcome. To disentangle the 
relative importance of these two goals in mitigating government responsiveness to business 
would require additional cases to enhance variation. At this stage, we can research the 
combined impact of electoral and revenue effects on government responsiveness to business, 
and allow for the development of hypotheses to be tested systematically in subsequent 
research on new cases. 
The empirical study comprise investigations of the policymaking processes of 
inheritance tax reform in Sweden (2004) and in Austria (2007), and corporate tax reform in 
Sweden (2013) and Austria (2005). Inheritance tax reform occurred in both countries under 
Social Democratic-led government coalitions, while corporate tax reform were enacted by 
governments of the Right. This means that we cannot control systematically for effects of 
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party politics since we have no instances of Social Democratic led corporate tax reform and 
no instances of Conservative-led reform of inheritance tax. The case-selection establishes 
however a set of ramifications that theoretically gives an edge to party politics as an 
alternative explanation. We expect a strong response in inheritance tax -- traditionally among 
the most redistributive type of taxes (OECD 2010; IMF 2013; Piketty 2014; Scheve & 
Stasavage 2016) that theoretically is well-protected against business pressure under Left wing 
incumbency. In corporate tax policy, where we expect a moderate response by governments 
of the Right, partisan theory would expect a strong and non-moderated response. We return to 
the possible effects of partisan politics for the empirically observed developments in the 
conclusion. Another alternative to what we propose is that the organizational strength behind 
the pressure on governments to produce tax cuts varied across the two taxes. The chosen 
design and the case-selection allow us to disregard organizational differences as a relevant 
explanation. In both countries, the interests of organized business are coordinated by peak 
organizations. The Confederation of Swedish Business and the Austrian Chamber of 
Commerce called and lobbied for cuts on corporate as well as inheritance taxes.   
Data for this paper was gathered from OECD databases on tax revenues, Swedish and 
Austrian parliamentary records, papers, reports and publications produced by their respective 
national business organizations, media outlets, and existing research and literature. In 
researching Swedish inheritance tax policy, we also conducted three interviews with key 
informants participating in the policymaking process.  
  
The Political Economy of Inheritance Taxation  
The outcomes of inheritance tax reform in Austria and Sweden is consistent with what we 
expected; both countries abolished inheritance and gift taxes, in 2007 and 2004, respectively. 
In this section, we analyze these decisions, beginning with a brief overview of revenues from 
inheritance and gift taxes in the two countries. As Figure 1 shows, revenues in both countries 
have been below the OECD average since 1965. In Sweden, revenues from these taxes have 
been consistently lower than the OECD average and varied between 0.10 and 0.13 percent of 
GDP over the last five decades, dropping to zero when inheritance and gift taxes were 
repealed in 2004. In Austria, revenues from inheritance and gift taxes were even lower, and 
varied between 0.09 to 0.05 percent of GDP prior to the abolition of inheritance and gift taxes 
in 2007. As in Sweden, Austria’s revenues declined to zero after inheritance and gift taxes 
were abolished in 2007.  
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Figure 1: Inheritance and gift tax revenues as percent of total taxation, 1965-2015. 
 
 
The Political Economy of Inheritance Taxation in Sweden 
Swedish inheritance and gift taxes were repealed as part of a reform enacted under the Social 
Democratic led government in 2004 (Proposition 2004/5: 25). The political dynamic toward 
repeal developed in 1991, when the Conservative party took office and launched a “Tax 
Policy for Growth” proposal. The reform caused a drop in effective tax rates on personal 
wealth from super-large estates from nearly 44 to 22 percent, while the effective tax rate 
imposed on wealth from small estates increased from 3.5 to 5.5 percent (Du Rietz et al. 2012: 
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37). The political Left opposed the tax reform, arguing that huge tax relief for the wealthiest 
groups violated long-standing principles of societal fairness and economic equality (Motion 
1991/92: Sk21) (Sveriges Riksdag 1992). Nevertheless, a few years into the new millennium, 
it was a Social Democratic government that presented a repeal proposal in the Swedish 
parliament (Prop 2004/05:25). Broad support had emerged in the Parliamentary Committee on 
tax policy affairs, and the proposal was approved by a significant majority on December 16,, 
2004. (Protokoll 2004/05:52) (Sveriges Riksdag 2004b).   
This policy of business friendliness was the result of a campaign designed and 
orchestrated by organized business. From the early 1980s, the Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise (CSE) engineered a pro-market movement to challenge political consensus about 
the Swedish welfare state, taxation policy and the public sector. The CSE provided new 
libertarian think tanks with financial support in a strategy to transform the ideological climate 
in a pro-market direction (Blyth 2001; Kinderman 2016). Cuts in wealth and inheritance taxes 
became a priority in the early 1990s, and the Conservative party was strongly influenced by 
the CSE.  
In the early 2000s, the CSE decided to launch a final campaign against inheritance taxes 
(Interview 1#). Interest group representatives and politicians explain uniformly that political 
pressure for reform was coordinated by the CSE (Interview #1, #2, #3). When the Social 
Democratic Prime Minister, in 2003, invited labor unions and employer organizations for 
rounds of “economic growth talks”, the CSE came with a call for the total repeal of 
inheritance and wealth taxation as a top-priority (Ydstedt and Wollstad 2015). At that point, 
the organization had invested considerable resources to prime the public opinion to support 
repeal (Interview #1). Several meetings were arranged with business owners to be held at 
workplaces around the country, and the organization facilitated the writing of hundreds of 
newspaper articles on the issue in those years (Ydstedt and Wollstad 2015). This was an effort 
to carefully frame inheritance taxes as a threat to family-owned businesses, and a matter of 
keeping jobs in Sweden. There were two reasons for framing the campaign in terms of family 
business and job loss. First; “few people understand the tax issue, whereas everyone can relate 
to losing one’s job.” Second; “had it been framed as a regular tax cut, it would be associated 
with an attack on the financial viability of the welfare state. We would have lost that battle 
immediately.” (Interview #1, #2) The CSE also demanded data from Statistics Sweden to 
illustrate that many family-owned firms would be subjects to ownership change in the near 
future, and that many jobs were at risk. The risks cited were that these firms would be forced 
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to declare bankruptcy as a result of inheritance tax liabilities, or they would decide to relocate 
to more business-friendly environments (Interview #1).  
The revenue-raising capacity of inheritance and gift taxes, as demonstrated, has 
historically been low in Sweden, and the fiscal consequences of a business friendly attitude 
for this policy therefore modest. The government, in its proposal for reform, stated that a main 
reason for repealing the tax was the high administrative expenses relative to the modest public 
income that the inheritance tax generated (Sveriges Riksdag 2004a). The tax was repealed, as 
mentioned, in a broad consensus, although a debate emerged in the parliament about why the 
tax was repealed. While the government emphasized the high administrative costs and low 
revenues, the Conservative Party also wanted the Social Democratic government to 
acknowledge the harmful effects of the tax on business and investments (Sveriges Riksdag 
2004a: 29).  
This act of signaling business friendliness was also considered from an electoral 
perspective. Organized business framed the issue as a matter of keeping jobs in Sweden in 
order to appeal to middle-class interests. However, of equal importance was the fact that after 
the 1992 reform briefly discussed above, exemption levels were merely a quarter of the 
annual income of a blue-collar production worker, and the top marginal tax rate took effect at 
a level just over the double annual income of that worker. The tax had become 
disadvantageous to the middle class. The government referred to the way in which the tax had 
become a burden on the average citizen, for whom inheritance taxes constantly increased as a 
function of increasing prices on houses and properties. Complicated exemptions and 
possibilities to register on special lists on the Swedish stock exchange also allowed large 
fortunes to avoid high effective tax rates (Sveriges Riksdag 2004a: 21). In other words, the 
government saw the tax, which generated few revenues, as particularly unfair to the middle 
class, and found itself in a desirable position of making a business-friendly response with 
modest financial implications that also aligned well with voter interests. A survey of tax 
policy attitudes conducted during the year in which the tax was repealed (2004) showed 70 
percent of Swedes either “supported” or “strongly support” lower inheritance taxes. Only 4 
percent supported raising the tax (Hammar et al. 2004: 101). These figures were highlighted 
by the Conservative Party during the parliamentary debate (Sveriges Riksdag 2004a: 29) 
(Protokoll 2004/05: 52, 29) and as a CSE informant explained: to the extent that the 
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politicians “considered electoral consequences of repeal, we had made sure that they would 
discover an electoral advantage in such a move.” (Interview #1)1  
 
The Political Economy of Inheritance Taxation in Austria 
In 2007, opponents of the inheritance tax used a decision by the constitutional court to push 
for inheritance tax repeal in Austria. The incident that triggered the repeal effort was a 
Constitutional Court decision in March 2007 (Verfassungsgerichtshof 2007). In most cases, 
the assessed value used for tax purposes was lower than the actual market value of real estate. 
A person inheriting real estate would thus pay less inheritance tax than a person inheriting the 
cash equivalent of the current market value of that property. The court had decided that such 
unequal treatment of different types of assets for tax purposes was unconstitutional. The court 
set a deadline of June 2008 for a revision of the inheritance tax law. Without this revision, the 
inheritance tax would automatically expire.2 Opponents of inheritance tax used this court 
decision to call for a repeal of the tax, even though the court did not call for that. 
In the months preceding the court decision, business representatives had stepped up 
their campaign against the inheritance tax, in expectation of a favorable decision by the court. 
In August 2006, the Minister of Finance in the coalition government of the People’s Party 
(OVP) and the Freedom Party (FPO), Karl-Heinz Grasser (husband to the heir of the 
Swarovski jewelry firm), had proposed abolishing the inheritance tax in a newspaper 
interview (Geyer 2006). At the same time, the Chamber of Commerce (Wirtschaftskammer 
Österreich, WKO), the statutory representation of all firms in Austria, demanded the abolition 
of the inheritance tax. Chamber president Christoph Leitl argued that if heirs were unable to 
pay the tax, a company would have to close down, destroying jobs (Wirtschaftskammer 
Österreich 2006; Paulick 2006: 2; Goldberg 2007: 84). Similarly, Karl Bruckner, vice-
president of the Chamber of Business Accountants and CEO of the accounting firm BDO, 
presented in the media as a “tax expert”, called for abolition of the tax (e.g. Kommenda 2007: 
6). 
The Government coalition between the Social Democrats (SPO) and the People’s Party 
(OVP) were divided on the issue. The Social Democrats wanted to revise the law, the 
People’s Party wanted to repeal it. The latter had the upper hand since, without a reform, the 
                                                             
1 The Confederation of Swedish Labor Unions had not been active on this issue, but they 
nevertheless expressed opposition with an appeal to principles of societal fairness (LO 2004). In 
2014, the organization called for reinstatement of the tax (LO 2014: 11). 
2 It is important to note that the court did not declare the inheritance tax unconstitutional, but 
only a specific feature of the tax, which the court decided to be in need for revision/ 
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tax would expire automatically. The Minister of Finance, Wilhelm Molterer, from the ÖVP, 
had declared on March 8th, 2007, the day the court decision was announced, that he ruled out 
any revision (wai 2007: 3). The opposition Freedom Party also demanded abolition of the 
inheritance tax. The Greens, also in opposition, demanded a reform. Together, the Social 
Democrats and Greens held 89 seats in Austria’s parliament, just three short of the required 
92-seat majority. On March 14, 2007, Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer (SPÖ) announced that 
the government would not revise the law, thus ending inheritance tax  (Der Standard 2007: 
1).3 
Why did the Social Democrats give in so quickly? A continuation of inheritance tax 
could for example have been traded off against cuts in corporate taxes (Moser 2007: 7). 
Opponents of inheritance tax focused on two arguments: First, they argued that inheritance 
tax is a tax on the middle classes, rather than on the upper class (e.g. Grimm 2007). Second, 
they pointed out that inheritance tax generates very little revenues: They called it a “trifle 
tax”, not worth the efforts of engineering a reform. They also pointed out the complexity of 
overhauling the tax system in such a way that the requirements of the constitutional court for 
equal tax treatment of the different types of assets would be met. In short, the revenues 
collected would not justify the reform effort. 
Since both arguments have some validity, it was difficult for the supporters of 
inheritance tax to counter them. Past reforms had created opportunities for wealthy 
individuals to avoid inheritance tax. The reform of the foundation law in 1993 had allowed 
individuals to circumvent inheritance tax by setting up a private foundation. Transferring 
assets to a private foundation is taxed at one-time rate of five percent 
(Stiftungseingangssteuer). The costs of setting up a private foundation are considerable, 
however, so it pays off only for the very wealthy. Approximately 3400 private foundations 
existed in Austria in 2008, and they held assets of about 80 billion euros. About 60 percent of 
their assets at that time came from corporate sources, 20 percent from private sources, and 20 
percent from real estate (Schmidl and Schratzenstaller 2011: 404-5).  
The tax privileges of private foundations created complications in enacting a consistent 
reform in line with the court decision. The court’s demand that all types of assets be treated 
equally would have required a reform not only of the inheritance tax, but also of the rules for 
private foundations. Another complication concerned the property tax, which is levied by the 
                                                             
3 Gusenbauer had insisted on a revision of the law in a TV interview three days earlier. The 
Federation of Labor Unions (OGB) and the Chamber of Labor (AK), the statutory interest 
representation of wage-earners, protested the government’s decision (Moser, K. & Stuiber, P. 
2007. "Kanzler Gibt Bei Erbschaftssteuer Nach". Der Standard,, 15 March: 8.. 
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municipalities. Since the system for assessing property value is the same for all types of taxes 
-- i.e., property tax, gift tax and inheritance tax -- compliance with the court decision would 
thus have required a reform of the property tax regulation as well to maintain consistency, in 
effect raising the tax burden on land- and homeowners (e.g. Salzburger Nachrichten 2007; 
Bachner 2007: 32). In short, the issues raised by the court decision were of such complexity 
that the creation of a consistent and court-compliant tax system would have required a 
comprehensive overhaul of the entire tax system (M.K. 2007: 25). Opponents of inheritance 
tax used this complexity argument to argue that a reform would not be worth the effort (e.g. 
Schellhorn 2007).  
The opponents of inheritance tax emphasized altogether three arguments: inheritance 
tax imposes a disproportionate burden on the middle class; that revising the law would be a 
complex affair, and that the limited revenues from inheritance taxes did not justify the reform 
effort. Media statements suggest that the Austrian Social Democratic leadership concluded 
that fighting to keep the inheritance tax was not worth the effort, given these considerations. 
The labor unions and the party’s rank-and-file protested the decision by the party leadership 
(Presse 2007: 1) and the Chancellor promised to bring the issue back on the government’s 
agenda at a later point. (Der Standard 2007: 1). While the Social Democrats did not support 
the abolition of inheritance tax, they found it difficult to counter the arguments of opponents. 
Business interests prevailed in this case because of (a) their ability to construct an alliance 
with middle class voters; and (b) the limited revenue relevance of the tax. In short, the 
available evidence suggests that campaigning by business interests combined with 
considerations about the small revenue size and attention to middle class interests persuaded 
the Austrian Social Democrats to give in on this issue, thereby clearing the way to abolition. 
  
The Political Economy of Corporate Tax Cuts 
Corporate taxes raise significantly more revenues than inheritance taxes. Corporate tax cuts 
are also a direct benefit to the interest of firms and their owners, and not a tax cut that directly 
benefit voters. We thus expect the goal conflicts of taxing business to be more intense in the 
area of corporate tax compared to inheritance tax. Governments risk losing considerably more 
revenues from a reduction in corporate tax contributions, while at the same get in tension with 
the voters. For 2015, revenues from corporate taxes were about 2.97 percent in Sweden, and 
2.25 percent in Austria, both roughly at the level of the OECD average (see figure 2).  
Yet, a rate cut might turn out as revenue-neutral for two reasons: First, a broadening of 
the tax base through closing of tax credits and allowances may soften the impact on revenues. 
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Second, a rate cut may attract foreign investments or, alternatively, induce multi-national 
firms to shift profits from higher-rate jurisdictions to that country. Governments can, thus, 
design cuts to corporate taxes in such a way that they see reason to expect them to be revenue-
neutral, even though they can not guarantee such an outcome. Empirically, looking at the EU 
averages, we can observe that effective tax rates on corporate income have declined since the 
mid-1990s. Valenduc estimates that the effective tax burden on corporate income in the EU28 
declined from 28 percent in 1995 to 16 percent in 2011 (2018: Figure 5). The European 
Commission, using a different econometric model, estimates that the effective tax rate on 
corporate income went down from 25 percent in 2004 to 21 percent in 2017 (European 
Commission 2018: Graph 17). At the same time, revenues from corporate taxation remained 
stable at the EU and OECD averages and within a range of about 2.5 to 3.5 percent of GDP 
(see figure 2 and European Commission 2018, Graph 16). Looking at individual OECD 
countries, no downward convergence of corporate tax revenues occurred over recent decades 
(seeOECD 2017). In sum, the general picture for the OECD world is one of a downward trend 
in the effective tax rates on corporate income, combined with stability in revenues, which 
results primarily from a disproportionate growth of corporate income relative to GDP growth. 
Austria and Sweden fit into this broader trend of lower tax rates and revenue stability. 
Statutory corporate tax rates have been debated recurrently in Sweden and successively 
lowered since the early 1990s. Beginning in 1993, rates were lowered from 30 to 28 percent, 
in 2009 further reduced to 26.3 percent, and in 2013 to 22 percent (SOU 2014: 40). Despite 
these reductions, the revenue-generating capacity of the tax remained strikingly stable 
throughout the period, and even tended upward. Currently, Swedish corporate taxes generate 
revenues of around three percent of GDP, which is close to the average of other European 
Union member countries.  
In Austria as well, the corporate tax has always been a more important source of public 
revenues than inheritance tax. In 2008, the last year Austria levied inheritance tax, revenues 
from inheritance tax were at 0.05 percent of GDP, while revenues from corporate taxation 
were at 2.4 percent of GDP (OECD 2017). In 2005, the government reduced the statutory rate 
on corporate income (Körperschaftssteuer) from 34 percent to 25 percent. At the same time, 
some exemptions were reduced or abolished to limit the effect of the rate cut on revenue size. 
The long-term development of corporate tax revenues in Austria has tended upwards, from an 
average of about 1.5 percent of GDP in the late 1960s to 2.4 percent in 2016. The 2005 cut in 
the statutory rate had no overall negative effect on revenues, as shown in figure 2 below.  
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In both countries, the rate cuts came with some broadening of the tax base, such as 
closing of allowances and credits. Yet, the net effect was in both countries a reduction of the 
effective tax burden on corporate income (see figure 3). To measure the effective tax rate we 
use the Effective Average Tax Rate (EATR), an indicator developed the Center for European 
Economic Research in Mannheim on behalf of the European Commission. This indicator 
builds on a micro-economic simulation model of the tax burden on an average firm taking 
into account the relevant rates and tax allowances, an approach known among economists as 
the Devereux/Griffith methodology. (ZEW 2017) In both countries, the data on the effective 
average tax rate on corporate income reflect the effects of these reforms (2004 in Austria, 
2013 in Sweden) as figure 3 shows. The cumulative effective size of the cuts is at about 5 to 6 
percent of corporate income in both countries. 
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Figure 2: Revenues from corporate taxation in Austria and Sweden, as percent of total 
taxation. 
 
Source: OECD 2017  
Figure 3 Effective Average Tax Rates on Corporate Income 
 
Source: ZEW 2017, average for all sectors 
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The Political Economy of Corporate Taxes in Sweden 
In 2013, Sweden cut its statutory corporate tax rate from 26.3 to 22 percent. The Swedish 
business confederation, CSE, perceived this policy change as the outcome of a persistent 
focus from the organization on this as well as other measures, with implications for the 
Swedish business investment climate (Svenskt Näringsliv 2013: 5). The reform was included 
in the budget proposal of the right-wing coalition government composed of the Conservative 
Party, the Liberal Party, Center Party and Christian Democrats for the fiscal year 2013. The 
government legitimized its corporate tax reform program by invoking OECD studies showing 
corporate taxes as among the most harmful to economic growth. The tax break for business, 
as mentioned, was accompanied by compensatory measures that would offset some of the 
revenues lost. However, the government also counted on dynamic economic effects. The tax 
reform was altogether underfinanced and expected to generate a short-term deficit of 
approximately one billion euros (Sveriges Riksdag 2012c) Prop. 2012/13: 1 Utgiftsområde 
24, 38). The government was clearly aware of the symbolic value of low statutory tax rates. 
The official proposal stated that statutory corporate tax rates are important when business and 
companies operating in a global economy decide on investment location. And because the 
pre-reform tax rate was relatively higher compared to other European countries, this 
difference alone could legitimate a tax reduction. It was expected that with further European 
integration, business and investments would relocate to low-tax countries (Sveriges Riksdag 
2012d: 3).   
Sweden’s Social Democratic Party, in opposition, submitted an independent budget 
proposal that cited lower corporate taxes as a structurally appropriate measure. However, the 
Social Democrats would not support a reform that relied on dynamic effects. Instead they 
proposed a cost-neutral reduction to 24 percent (Sveriges Riksdag 2012a: 80) Motion 
2012/13: Fi302, 80). The Left Party, in the meantime, actually wanted to raise the statutory 
rate. While recognizing the importance of internationally competitive statutory corporate tax 
rates, the Left Party referred to the low effective corporate tax rates in Sweden and proposed 
raising the statutory rate to 28 percent. The Left Party also proposed imposing a one-time five 
percent tax on the four largest Swedish banks (Sveriges Riksdag 2012b) Motion 2012/13: 
Fi250). The governing coalition, however, had a parliamentary majority, and the debate ended 
with the statutory corporate tax rate being lowered to 22 percent. 
The very limited effect of the rate cut on revenues is partly due to compensatory 
measures. We are unable to calculate the precise contribution of the base broadening to 
revenue stability, but the government did adopt a number of measures clearly intended to 
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soften the reform’s impact on revenues. The tax base was broadened, deductions and tax 
credits were abolished, and loopholes were closed (SOU 2014: 70). As a matter of fact, after 
the major statutory tax cut in 2013, revenues from corporate taxes actually increased by 0.4 
percent of GDP between 2012 and 2015. The increasing revenues were mainly an effect of a 
compensatory measure that reduced the value of the deduction for investment interest 
expenses and dividends (Sveriges Riksdag 2012d: 39) 2012/13: FiU1: 39). The corporate tax 
cut in Sweden were thus enacted in a political exercise, where the government balanced 
challenges associated with international tax competition,  investment behavior of business, 
and the need to maintain a stable generation of public revenues (Sveriges Riksdag 2012c: 38) 
(Prop. 2012/13: 1 Utgiftsområde 24, 38).  
Politically, the Swedish parties of the left highlighted the interests of the middle class 
and unemployed against the interests of business. The Social Democratic party claimed that 
corporate tax reform was an inefficient means of creating jobs as opposed to further social 
investments in the form of increased family allowances, lower taxes on pensions, lower 
individual contributions to unemployment insurance schemes, and generally more generous 
social insurance programs (Sveriges Riksdag 2012a: 80).The Social Democrats rejected an 
underfinanced corporate tax reform that relied on expected dynamic effects, claiming that it 
would increase financial insecurity for Swedish households. The Social Democratic Party thus 
sought to establish a divide between middle class voters and their preference for generous 
social service provision, on the one hand, and business interests, on the other. The Left Party 
criticized the government’s proposal as preferential for big business and Swedish 
shareholders, with old-age pensioners, the sick and unemployed paying the price (Sveriges 
Riksdag 2012b).  
The politics of corporate taxes thus generated a more visible electoral dimension, or 
potential conflict, compared to what we observed in the case of inheritance tax reform. The 
opposition parties deliberately pitted the interests of business against middle class interests for 
social protection in order to expose the right-wing coalition and turn the middle class against 
it. Even if the right-wing government were willing to deliver what organized business asked 
for, it was still confronted by the gap between business preferences and the interests of voting 
public. The survey that in 2004 had shown a 70 percent majority of Swedes in favor of 
inheritance tax relief also showed that only 21 percent supported lower corporate taxes 
(Hammar et al. 2004: 101).  
To sum up, even a right-wing government, spearheaded by a Conservative Party closely 
connected to organized business and with a strong preference for business-friendly policies, 
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found itself forced to balance its decision on corporate tax cuts against the fiscal and electoral 
implications of such cuts in terms of loss of revenues at potential electoral repercussions. 
Middle class support for corporate tax cut was relatively weak, and political parties on the 
Left sought actively to establish a political divide between the business friendliness of the 
government and the social security interests of average citizens. In the field of corporate tax 
policy, governments are clearly maneuvering between conflicting goals.  
 
The Political Economy of Corporate Taxes in Austria 
In Austria, the major reduction of the statutory rate of corporate taxation from 34 to 25 
percent in 2005 was decided by a right-wing coalition government, consisting of the Freedom 
Party and the center-right People’s Party. In January 2004, Finance Minister Karl-Heinz 
Grasser, from the Freedom Party, announced the plan to cut the tax rate, combined with the 
elimination of some deductions. Hidden reserves and equity yield rate would now not be 
deductible anymore. The reform thus broadened the tax base, while at the same time lowering 
the tax rate (Friedinger 2004: 2). Financial analysts from Bank Austria estimated that the 
reform would increase after-tax profits of publicly listed firms by about 2 to 5 percent, 
depending on the firm (Himmelbauer 2004: 3). Since a reduction of the statutory tax rate from 
34 to 25 percent without changes in the tax base would translate into an increase in post-tax 
profits of about 15 percent, we may infer tentatively that the base broadening compensated for 
an average of at least two-thirds of the rate reduction.  
The government presented the reform as a signal to international investors required in 
response to the eastward enlargement of the European Union in 2004, since many of the new 
member countries in Central and Eastern Europe had cut their corporate tax rates to levels 
below 20 percent. In Austria’s neighboring countries of Hungary and Slovakia, for instance, 
the statutory rates were 16 percent and 19 percent, respectively.  
The reduction of the corporate tax rate was preceded by a controversial debate among 
tax experts. The tax lawyer Werner Doralt from the University of Vienna questioned whether 
the planned cut would be an effective instrument to stimulate investments. On the other side, 
a number of industrialists spoke out strongly in favor of a cut. Friedrich Roedler from the 
accounting firm PriceWaterhouseCoopers, for instance, said in a newspaper interview that 
“tax havens [are] at our doorstep: a tax cut is the right step.” Other executives who advocated 
for a cut in the media were Franz Ottawa (CEO of Hella, a car parts producer), Claus Raidl 
(CEO of Boehler-Uddeholm, a steel producer) and Hans-Jörg Schelling (CEO of Lutz, a 
furniture retailer, and vice-president of the Chamber of Commerce) (Friedinger and Polster 
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2003: 2). The president of the Chamber of Commerce, Christoph Leitl, praised the rate cut 
scheme as a “psychological nudge for more economic growth” (Marschall et al. 2004: 2-3; 
Matznetter 2004). 
The reform adopted consisted of a lowering of the statutory rate and a broadening of the 
tax base, similar to Sweden. The reform had no negative effect on revenues; measured in 
percent of GDP. Revenues declined during the Great Recession of 2009/2010, but they have 
since recovered to the pre-crisis level of about of 2.4 percent (2016). The Austrian corporate 
tax reform can be interpreted as a symbolic measure: it was intended to send a signal to 
foreign investors of Austria’s attractiveness in the wake of the European Union’s eastward 
enlargement. As such, the government intended the reform as a signal to business that Austria 
was a player in the field of tax competition with the East European neighbor countries. At the 
same time, however, the reform was designed to be revenue-neutral, partly because of the off-
setting measure, and partly because of an expected increase in investments. 
Business protagonists of the reform explicitly acknowledged that the reform would be 
unlikely to reduce tax revenues. Following the adoption of the cut, Chamber of Commerce 
president Christoph Leitl stated in 2006 that “While the Germans are debating tax reforms, we 
acted. The fact that the revenues from corporate tax are bubbling, despite the rate cut, shows 
that this was a good deal for the Ministry of Finance and for the public” (Wirtschaftskammer 
Österreich 2006). Similarly, the CEO of the accounting firm Deloitte, Bernhard Gröhs, told 
the newspaper Wirtschaftsblatt that “The tax cut was extremely important. The broadening of 
the tax base has no importance in international competition” (Marschall et al. 2004: 2-3). 
These statements show that business representatives attached greater importance to the rate 
cut than to the base broadening, possibly because they realized the base broadening as a 
necessary concession to the government.  
Since the reform, business continued to campaign for further cuts in the tax rate. In 
October 2016, the president of the Federation of Austrian Industrialists, Christoph Neumayer, 
demanded a rate cut from 25 to 20 percent, arguing that a rate cut would create jobs and 
growth (Industriellenvereinigung 2016b). Speaking about reform priorities in industry, 
Neumayer advocated a reduction of public spending, a reduction of non-wage labor costs, and 
a lowering of corporate tax on re-invested profits (Industriellenvereinigung 2016a; 
Industriellenvereinigung 2017). These statements indicate that cost reductions are the main 
priority for industry, with non-wage labor costs being the largest component.  
Speaking during the parliamentary debate on the reform, on May 6, 2004, the deputies 
of Austria’s governing parties, the ÖVP and the FPÖ, justified the corporate tax cut on the 
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grounds that it would be an important signal to international investors and that it would create 
jobs. Moreover, they argued that the reform was socially fair because of parallel tax cuts for 
low-wage earners. Minister of Finance Karl-Heinz Grasser pointed out that many of the 
Eastern European neighbor countries, which had just entered the European Union, had rates 
of around 19 to 20 percent. Grasser also claimed that the Austrian Business Agency, a 
government agency, had seen an increase of 77 percent in inquiries by foreign investors in 
response to the announcement of the tax cut. Alfred Finz (OVP), undersecretary in the 
Ministry of Finance, argued that the reform was socially just, since the jobs created by the tax 
cut would benefit everyone (Parlament der Republik Österreich 2004b; Parlament der 
Republik Österreich 2004c). 
The opposition parties, the Social Democrats (SPÖ) and the Greens, opposed the cut. 
SPÖ tax spokesman Christoph Matznetter argued that the cut benefitted mainly large 
corporations, and that Austria would become a “tax paradise for multinationals” (Parlament 
der Republik Österreich 2004a; Parlament der Republik Österreich 2004d). From the Greens, 
tax spokesperson Karl Öllinger doubted that the cut would create new jobs (Parlament der 
Republik Österreich 2004c). To sum up, the governing parties tried to present the rate cut as 
benefiting everyone, while this view was strongly contested by the opposition parties. To sum 
up, like in Sweden, the Austrian government designed corporate tax reform to attract 
investors but at the same time to be revenue-neutral.  Compared to inheritance tax, goal 
conflicts were more intense, though, because no electoral alliance with middle class interests 
was possible. Overall, however, government responsiveness to business demands was high 
also on corporate taxation, but softened somewhat by the compensatory measures designed to 
protect revenues. 
 
Discussion 
Our findings from a comparative study of four reforms of business-friendly tax-cuts, 
produced over the span of a decade by four different governments in two countries, show a 
high degree of government responsiveness to business demands, and this holds for both Social 
Democratic-led and Conservative-led governments. In none of the cases did governments 
resist business demands for tax cuts. However, important differences exist between the two 
policy fields that, as we have shown, resulted from the different intensity of conflicts with 
electoral and fiscal goals. Governments designed their responses to business demands in such 
ways that the risk of negative repercussions in terms of voter behavior and tax revenues were 
minimized. They did not sacrifice electoral and fiscal goals to maintain business confidence, 
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they aimed to reconcile these goals. They did so by focusing business-friendly reforms on 
measures that did not undermine revenues and that did not upset voters. 
Corporate taxes are fiscally significant, and corporate tax cuts are easily interpreted as 
undue benefits given to the wealthy at the expense of middle class interests for social security. 
Unlike with inheritance tax, an alliance with middle class interests was difficult to engineer, 
surveys showed little middle class support for corporate tax cuts. At the same time, tax cuts 
imposed a constraint on governments in this field. Statutory corporate tax rates were lowered, 
but the cuts were accompanied by base broadening measures that partly off-set the impact on 
revenues.  
In contrast, revenues generated by inheritance and gift taxes have historically been 
relatively insignificant, and these taxes are at the same time unpopular among average 
citizens. Governments can send a strong signal of business friendliness on this tax without 
significant goal conflicts. Hence, in Sweden and Austria, the inheritance tax was simply 
repealed. The fact that the different goals can be more easily reconciled under a measure to 
repeal this tax is reflected by the broad parliamentary consensus that emerged on inheritance 
tax repeal in Sweden.  
Consequently, our finding cannot support the idea that governments respond to the 
rising structural power of business without much leverage. A government capitulation to 
business preferences unconstrained by the fiscal and electoral moderator would most likely 
lead to the reverse output, i.e., a strong response in the area of corporate taxes, where 
organized business has the greater stake in. Furthermore, our theory has demonstrated 
explanatory value in a study of two small and open economies. These two economies are not 
only exposed to external economic conditions, but also characterized by declining 
institutional capabilities to contain the structural power of business.  
Our theory is also supported by the fact that inheritance tax repeal was implemented 
under Social Democratic incumbency in both countries, whereas corporate tax reforms were 
enacted by right-wing governments. It may seem surprising that Social Democratic 
governments, in the era of escalating economic inequality in Western democracies, are 
phasing out what has been considered as one of the most redistributive taxes in the entire tax 
code. Furthermore, inheritance tax is frequently advocated as an important instrument to 
prevent rising inequality and a means of increasing redistribution (OECD 2010; IMF 2013; 
Piketty 2014; Scheve and Stasavage 2016). The Social Democratic-led abolition of 
inheritance tax can be explained however as a product of efforts to reconcile business 
demands with voter preferences and revenue needs. While we do not have variation on 
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partisan orientation within each of the two policy fields, the fact that the abolition of 
inheritance tax happened in both countries under Social Democratic-led governments, 
suggests that the need for goal reconciliation shapes government reforms independent of 
partisan orientation. 
What we did not account for theoretically is the possibility that the articulation of 
middle class interests -- and, thus electoral prospects associated with reform -- is a function of 
interest group activity. Organized business in Sweden worked strategically to frame 
inheritance tax reform as a matter of keeping jobs and as a means of mobilizing public 
opinion to support inheritance tax repeal. Related studies also find that on the issue of 
inheritance tax reform, organized business deploys strategies to prime the public opinion 
(Graetz and Shapiro 2005; Emmenegger and Marx 2019). Electoral opinion on inheritance tax 
is thus likely not entirely external to the policymaking process. But neither is it entirely 
internal. A successful public strategy by organized business to influence public opinion is 
conditional on a policy design that incentivizes citizens to support lower inheritance taxes. If 
the difference in public preferences on the two taxes were internally created in the process, we 
would have observed an even stronger effort to prime the public to support corporate tax cuts, 
where business interests are most intense.  
Case studies are sensitive to contextual conditions, such as the role of a constitutional 
court decision for inheritance tax reform in Austria. However, our findings are not artifacts of 
case selection and peculiar contexts. They reveal a larger, more general pattern. Corporate tax 
revenues are generally higher than revenues from inheritance taxes in the OECD-area. 
Average statutory corporate tax rates in the OECD countries have generally declined, but 
revenues have nevertheless remained stable since the mid-1960s. Budgetary pressures 
normally require compensatory strategies when statutory rates are lowered (cf. Swank and 
Steinmo 2002). Public revenues from inheritance taxes are generally negligible, and other 
countries besides Sweden and Austria have repealed their inheritance taxes or are considering 
such a move (Graetz and Shapiro 2005; Scheve and Stasavage 2016). But there are also limits 
to what we can infer from this study. First, we cannot disentangle the independent effects of 
each of the two factors we theorized as moderating the response strategies of governments. 
Second; even though also larger countries in a globalized economy are pressured to respond 
to business demands, our argument is probably better equipped to explain the logic of small 
states in world markets (Katzenstein 1985). This category of countries is under severe 
pressure from external economic forces, as well as from domestic factors such as expanded 
social security arrangements that requires stability in terms of tax revenues. The consensus 
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oriented style of policymaking that Katzenstein proposed as the mechanism that constantly 
generated policy adjustments to shifting conditions of the day, may indeed be an institution of 
the past.  
But the political as well as economic pressure on these economies persist, governments 
are still forced to develop response strategies, and we provide an explanation for why and 
how such responses are likely to vary across policy issues. Governments have some, but not 
unlimited, discretion in how to respond to business interests. They will tend to be most 
accommodating in situations where the fiscal and electoral price of accommodating business 
demands is low. Yet, the price they pay for reconciling business demands with electoral and 
fiscal goals is the sacrifice of redistributive policies that either lack middle class support or 
that generate little revenue. 
 
 
Interviews 
Interview #1: Former employee – Confederation of Swedish Enterprise  
Interview #2: Head of section – Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
Interview #3: Former member of Swedish parliament  
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